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Abstract—A battery pack consisting of standard cylin-
drical 18650 lithium-ion cells has been chosen for small
satellite missions based on previous flight heritage and com-
pliance with NASA battery safety requirements. However,
for batteries that transit through the International Space
Station (ISS), additional certification tests are required
for individual cells as well as the battery packs. In this
manuscript, we discuss the development of generalized
testbeds for testing and certifying different types of bat-
teries critical to small satellite missions. Test procedures
developed and executed for this certification effort include:
a detailed physical inspection before and after experiments;
electrical cycling characterization at the cell and pack
levels; battery-pack overcharge, over-discharge, external
short testing; battery-pack vacuum leak and vibration
testing. The overall goals of these certification procedures
are to conform to requirements set forth by the agency and
identify unique safety hazards. The testbeds, procedures,
and experimental results are discussed for batteries chosen
for small satellite missions to be launched from the ISS.
I. INTRODUCTION
The International Space Station (ISS) plans to launch
100+ small-sat missions for different science experi-
ments in the next coming years [1]. Many of these mis-
sions will be powered by standard off-the-shelf cylindri-
cal 18650 lithium-ion cells in their current and updated
forms as technology improves. A battery pack consisting
of lithium-ion cells has been chosen to fly based on
previous flight heritage and compliance with NASA
battery safety requirements. Before batteries can be used
for small satellite missions on ISS, both the individual
cells as well as packs of multiple cells must be certified
for safe operations. Certification tests for the cells and
packs include electrical cycling characterization, over
charging/discharging, external shorting, vibrational exci-
tation, and exposure to vacuum. Only after each cell and
pack has passed these certification tests can the batteries
be installed in cube sats and delivered to the ISS.
Dependable, energy dense, and durable power sources
are critical components for small satellite missions. They
are subjected to the same strenuous operating conditions
that the satellite is subjected to during transit to the
ISS, deployment into space, and for the duration of the
mission after launch from the ISS. Since the batteries
come into close proximity to the astronauts on the ISS,
it is critical to establish rigorous testing procedures to
certify their safety.
Normal operation requires repeated charging and dis-
charging of the batteries that age the packs and can lead
to activation of internal fault protection systems. These
critical internal fault protection systems prevent the bat-
teries from destructively failing in adverse scenarios, and
protect electronic equipment from becoming damaged.
Through regular cycling of lithium-ion batteries from
full charge to low charge, the battery ages, losing the
ability to hold full charge and to recharge the same
amount. Through proper use and high quality con-
struction, lithium-ion batteries can survive hundreds to
thousands of these cycles depending on their operating
conditions. In order to properly charge and discharge
fully and efficiently, it is important to understand the
batteries’ charging characteristics. Cycling the batteries
from maximum charge to minimum charge provides
valuable information on the batteries, health and ability
to recharge. This cycling also ensures that the batteries
perform as specified and can be expected to perform
appropriately when in operation.
One of several adverse scenarios batteries may ex-
perience is unintentional battery shorting. Lithium-ion
batteries pose a risk of sharp temperature increases when
shorted, to the point of chemical and electrical failure.
This risks melting the battery and surrounding com-
ponents and expelling hazardous and corrosive gasses.
Internal short prevention in lithium-ion batteries effec-
tively opens the battery circuit, shutting off current flow
through the battery. This prevents damage to the battery
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and allows for possible future battery usage if the short
can be corrected or if the cell removed from operation. In
the 18650 lithium-ion cells, a PTC (Positive Temperature
Coefficient) switch is used to prevent short-circuiting by
inhibiting high current surges. This occurs via a large
increase in material resistance when the temperature
exceeds a threshold limit. The resistance can increase
to hundreds of thousands of ohms, which inhibits the
current from flowing from the battery. PTC switches
are reversible, and will cycle back to a conductive state
when the short circuit is removed, but they can suffer
in reliability when material standards are not upheld [2],
[3]. Despite having PTC switches installed, some 18650
lithium-ion batteries still fail due to high currents and
overheating, giving purpose to certification standards.
Another unfavorable condition leading to faults in the
cells is over charging/discharging. The ability to pre-
vent such damaging cycling protects sensitive electronic
systems powered by the batteries from being exposed
to high or low voltages that could terminate operation.
It also prevents over pressurization of the battery cells
while overcharging, and chemical aging resulting from
over discharging. CIDs (Current Interrupter Devices)
are capable of reversibly opening the positive battery
terminals circuit and preventing further charging of a
battery until internal pressure is alleviated [3]. These
devices prevent venting of hazardous electrolytes and
bursting due to buildup of high pressures.
Payloads aboard rockets are subjected to vibratory
loads over a large bandwidth of frequencies. These
vibrations pose a threat to internal and external structural
stability, can cause exterior leaks, internal shorting of the
batteries, and damage to protection circuits. Small-sat
missions are required to withstand prolonged exposure to
the vacuum of space. Electrolytic material is contained in
the battery using a simple crimp in the outer metal shell
of the batteries. Low quality crimp seals can allow elec-
trolytic material to leak in low-pressure environments,
diminishing battery charge and life. Certification of the
crimp is critical for ensuring that individual cells will
not leak after launching from the ISS.
Vacuum leak tests are conducted to observe any leaks
from the cell under very low-pressure conditions to
detect any manufacturing faults that may lead to oper-
ational failures of the batteries. A vibration testbed is
developed to conduct certification for physical connec-
tivity in the pack circuits and well as full charge battery
operation under launch and deployment environment
during which the batteries undergo maximum vibration
loads. A prolonged electrical short test is conducted to
observe the activation of safety circuit in the battery
packs to avoid any fire hazard. We will discuss each
of the developed testbeds in later sections of the paper
and also discuss the test results observed.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section II
discusses the safety related requirements for space flight
batteries. Section III describes different fault modes that
may lead to accidents depending upon usage and abusive
operating conditions. Section IV discuss the certification
testbed setup, tests conducted and some results. The pa-
per ends with conclusions and future work in Section V.
II. SAFETY
The main abuse conditions that cause hazards in
lithium-ion cells are overcharge, external and internal
short circuits, over-discharge, high temperatures, and
structural issues.
Safety is the key aspect of any energy storage device,
including batteries. It is important to understand that
batteries contain both oxidizer (anode) and fuel (cathode)
in a sealed container. Under normal operations, the fuel
and oxidizer convert the chemical energy to electrical
energy with minimal heat and negligible gas [4]. If
allowed to react chemically in an electrochemical cell,
the fuel and oxidizer convert the chemical energy directly
into heat and gas. Once started, chemical reaction will
likely proceed to completion [5].
The battery safety approval process for all payloads is
conducted by a duly designated Payload Safety Review
Panel (PSRP). This process should be considered in
the early stages of the payload design process, so that
the PSRP and other teams can agree upon a process
specific to the anticipated battery chemistry and payload
power requirements. One of the key requirements for
an acceptable battery design is to include controls for
any potential battery hazards [6]. An acceptable battery
design should consider structural integrity of the cell
and battery housings, the likelihood of gas generation,
pressure or electrolyte leakage, the prevention of short
circuits, probability for high battery temperatures, over-
discharging, and ability of efficient charging methods.
The battery evaluation will assess the battery hazard
controls which are dependent on parameters such as
battery chemistry, capacity, applications, etc.
Safety needs have to be addressed at the cell, pack,
device and ultimately at the mission level. Failure at low
levels can have a cascading effect at higher levels which
directly affects overall mission safety. It is difficult to
define safety by a single parameter. A set of approaches
is combined together to enhance safety by a) reducing
the probability of an unsafe event, b) reducing potentil of
harm to personnel, c) minimizing the effect of an unsafe
event on mission completion and safety [6].
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III. TYPICAL FAILURE MODES
Although there are some common failure modes de-
spite different chemistries, some of the failure modes
are unique to individual chemistries [5]. When batteries
are operated beyond their nominal operating conditions,
generation of excessive heat can lead to faults. It is
very important to understand the limitations of the bat-
tery chemistry and probable operating conditions of the
mission. Some of the failures observed in lithium-ion
batteries are discussed below.
A. Charge Discharge Failures
Failures due to overcharge and over-discharge can
occur if either the internal electronics on the battery or
control electronics on the battery pack malfunction. The
capability of a battery cell or pack to resist overcharge
depends on the charging current level as well as specific
chemistry of the battery. The reaction to any overcharge
condition depends on factors such as control electronics,
current, maximum voltage, thermal environment and
chemistry. [7]. During a charge cycle, lithium is removed
from the cathode oxide material. If the battery cell is
charged beyond the limit threshold lithium continues
to be removed from the cathode structure, leading to
permanent crystallographic changes and increased oxi-
dation potentials [5]. It has been observed that there is
an instantaneous increase in heat generation when all the
lithium ions are removed from the cathode structure.
B. External Short
External short is one of the most frequent abusive
conditions a cell may undergo during operation. Large
cells that can carry higher short circuit currents may
cause violent cell venting and thermal runaway condition
leading to accidents. An external short under excessive
thermal conditions could lead to thermal runaway con-
dition in the cells [8].
C. Internal Short
Internal short faults have been studied due to accidents
reported during transportation [3], [9]. These accidents
could be caused due to any of the following conditions:
• If the manufacturing quality control is not stringent
there is a relatively high probability of accidental
internal cell shorts due to the presence of impurities
such as metal particles, burrs, etc.
• During transportation any foreign object debris or
native contaminants during manufacturing could
manifest themselves, leading to a unwanted mishap.
• Dendrites are formed inside the cells when they
are subjected to voltages, currents and temperatures
when operated beyond the manufacturers recom-
mendation.
• Dendrites are also formed due to localized heating
or large thermal gradients within a battery module.
• Incorrect cell design may lead to dry out of the
electrode in certain areas of the cell, which may
lead to internal shorting.
IV. CERTIFICATION TESTBEDS AND RESULTS
Experiments used off-the-shelf 18650 cells rated at
2100 mA. A battery pack consisted of 2 cells in series,
which were in parallel with another set of 2 cells in se-
ries. A LITH-XTM fire extinguisher powder is kept close
to the testbeds in case any emergency situation arises
during the electrochemical and external short procedures.
Table I notes the different roles and responsibilities of
each of the personnel associated with the certification
process. The processes that have to be followed during
each of the certification tests are discussed later in the
section.
A. Electrical Cycling Characteristics
In this section we discuss the setup for the elec-
trochemical characterization of the batteries. In the
electrical cycling characterization procedure, cells and
packs are subjected to flight charge/discharge profiles.
The battery packs are subjected to different operating
conditions to test the safety mechanisms under adverse
conditions. The tests are conducted using a MACCOR
4000 shown in Fig. 1, which is a battery tester that allows
for a range of fully automated, computerized tests. The
steps for preparing the battery cells for the experiment
are as follows:
• Record the S/N for each battery cell on the physical
and electrochemical characteristics log.
• Record dimensions of all cells using a calibrated
caliper.
• Record weight of all cells.
• If the cell voltage is below 4.0 V, then recharge the
cells before performing the closed circuit voltage
(CCV) test.
CCV tests are performed on all cells using a 1.0 C
current for 30 seconds. Current, voltage, and temperature
measurements are recorded for all tests. The cells are
charged using the Constant Current/Constant Voltage
(CC/CV) protocol and discharged as follows:
• Measure and record Open Circuit Voltage (OCV)
of battery packs.
• Charge the cells using a C/2 current to 4.2 V and
then hold at a constant voltage of 4.2 V until the
current drops to about 50 mA.
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TABLE I
ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITY TABLE OF NODES BATTERIES BUILD PROCEDURES
Position Role Responsibilities
Engineer/Technician Operator The Engineer/Technician performs the procedures.
Operations Engineer Inspector The Operations Engineer inspects the final product of the Engineer/Technician.
Quality Assurance Representative Observer Representative ensures procedures are followed, safety concerns are mitigated, and
provides confirmation stamps at required points.
• Provide a rest period of 10 minutes after charge.
• Discharge the cells using a C/2 current to a cutoff
voltage of 3.0 V. A pulse shall be performed at the
midpoint of the discharge with a 3.0 C or 1.5 C
current for 100 ms.
• Provide a rest period of 15 minutes after discharge.
• Record current, voltage and temperature during the
cycles in the log file.
Similar steps are followed for the electrochemical
characteristics of the battery packs. If the battery voltage
is below 8.0 V, then recharge the cells and battery packs
before performing the CCV test. If the voltage of the
battery pack falls below 6.0 V, then it is recharged
and the OCV is measured and recorded. The CCV
test is performed on all battery packs using a 1.0 C
current for 30 seconds. All battery packs undergo two
charge/discharge cycles before they are subjected to the
tests for safety evaluation of battery packs. Current,
voltage, and temperature measurements are recorded for
all tests. The protocols followed for these battery pack
cycles are provided below:
• Charge and discharge the battery pack using the
cell protocol in section above (with C/2 charge and
discharge rates).
• Record voltage at which the MOSFET switch acti-
vates.
• Record current, voltage and temperature during the
cycles are recorded through the MACCOR test unit.
B. Over-charge and Over-discharge
Battery pack overcharge/overdischarge tests are dis-
cussed in this section. These tests are required to charac-
terize and confirm the safety of the lithium-ion cells and
battery packs that are to be used in flight satellite battery
systems. In this test we measure current and voltage of
the battery pack and temperature of the individual cells.
Cells and batteries are capable of venting electrolyte
leading to thermal runaway conditions and ultimately
causing fire, when they operate beyond their normal
operating range. Hence all safety tests shall be carried
out in an abuse chamber and the necessary precautions
taken to prevent injury to personnel and damage to
equipment. The over charge test intends to characterize
Fig. 1. Electrical Testbed
Fig. 2. Sample plot for Electrical Cycling Profile
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Fig. 3. Sample plot for Over-Charge Test Profile
and confirm the overcharge protection device in the
battery. The following steps are followed:
• Record battery S/N and battery cells S/N.
• Overcharge a fully charged battery pack with pro-
tective circuit board to a total voltage of 9 V with
a 1.0 C current until the test is stopped due to a
high resistance caused by MOSFET activation or a
maximum of 6 hours.
• Record the voltage at which the MOSFET switch
activates in the log sheet. A sample plot of the test
shown in Fig. 3.
• Record current, voltage and temperature for all the
tests.
Similarly an over-discharge test is run to characterize
and confirm the over-discharge protection device in the
battery.
• Record battery S/N and battery cells S/N.
• Over-discharge a battery pack with protective cir-
cuit board with a 3.0 C current to 0 A. The safety
MOSFET should have activated by this point.
• Report the voltage at which the safety MOSFET
activates in the log.
• Record current, voltage and temperature for all the
tests as shown in plot of Fig. 4.
The internal circuit board should prevent the battery
pack from going into a reversal condition.
C. External Short
This section describes the procedures needed to pre-
pare battery cells and packs for the external battery
short procedure. This procedure is conducted as a next
Fig. 4. Sample plot for Over-Discharge Test Profile
step after having passed the physical and electrochemical
characteristics tests discussed earlier in the section.
For consistency, a 10-mΩ circuit is used as a short
for testing. It is necessary to ensure that this circuit
would be able to withstand high currents and heat that
the temporary short, and possibly failed battery extended
short would create. The current generated by the short
can be calculated using Ohms law:
Is = Vb/Rs (1)
where Is is current from short, Vb is test battery
voltage, and Rs is the 10 mΩ short circuit resistor. The
current flow experienced during the short test increases
linearly with voltage and requires heavy gage wiring to
prevent melting.
The test fixture was encased in a metal enclosure, as
shown in Fig.5, to prevent high temperature or possible
flame or smoke from escaping a controllable area. Within
this enclosure two relays are used for controlling the test,
clips to attach the battery to the external short and mea-
surement systems, a thermocouple to monitor the battery
and short temperature, and a wire block to act as a stress
reliever for wiring. When the short was activated from
a control computer using the low resistance relay, the
voltage spike and subsequent drop, as well as calculated
current spike and drop were examined and recorded. The
drop was measured using a picometer connected through
PC and recorded to the microsecond scale as shown in
Fig. 6. This allows for a high-resolution image of the
activation of the PTC circuit and prevention of extended
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Fig. 5. External Short Testbed
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Fig. 6. A sample plot of the initial time frame capture for Short Test
Procedure
shorting. For the PTC circuit to be considered fully
operational, the short must hold the circuit voltage and
current to zero, and maintain those levels for the total test
duration of 6 hours. Once this time period was completed
and the battery showed no signs of re-initialization of
shorting, the test was ended and the battery declared to
have passed the test.
Fig. 7. Developed GUI for Short Test Procedure
In case the MOSFET does not reset itself, a destructive
physical analysis of the battery pack is performed to
determine cell integrity. The battery packs are opened up
and the performance and safety of each cell confirmed
by removing them from the pack and subjecting them to
charge/discharge cycling. The charge/discharge protocol
for cells is as discussed in Section IV-A. We recorded
current, voltage and temperature of the battery pack and
cells through the data acquisition system as shown in
Fig. 7. If the over-current protection in the battery pack
does not activate as expected, the battery design shall
not be used for flight applications and may require a
redesign and retest to confirm that the updated design
provides external short protection.
D. Vacuum Test
The ISS is the launch platform for small-sats, which
orbits at an altitude of 400 km above Earth. While
the boundary between Earth and space is defined as
the Karman line at 100 km above Earth, there are
gaseous particles extending to 10,000 km. The ISS still
experiences drag due to Earth’s atmosphere at its orbital
altitude. Air pressure at sea level is approximately 760
Torr, and decreases exponentially with altitude. Using
the barometric formula one can provide a reasonable
estimate of pressure versus altitude. The pressure esti-
mate is limited to about 100 km when not accounting
for change in temperature with altitude.
P = Pb ∗ [Tb/(Tb +Lb ∗ (h−hb))]((gθ ∗M)/(R∗ ∗Lb))
(2)
P is the calculated pressure at altitude h, with Pb and
hb representing reference pressure and altitude. Lb is the
standard temperature lapse rate, gθ is gravitational accel-
eration, and M is the molar mass of Earth’s air. Using
equation 2 the pressure is estimated to be approximately
0.001 Torr, or 0.0001% of atmospheric pressure.
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Based upon previous tests and the need for a stream-
lined, reliable and repeatable testing procedure, a pres-
sure of 5 Torr was chosen as the testing threshold pres-
sure in the chamber seen in Fig. 8. While not equivalent
to the near complete vacuum present at the altitude of
the ISS, 5 Torr (0.1 psi) is roughly 0.65% of atmospheric
pressure at sea level. This pressure is much more man-
ageable to create and maintain in a laboratory setting
consistently, and based upon previous results provides
adequate near vacuum conditions to replicate conditions
subjected to the batteries in deployment. Batteries are
held at this pressure to test the crimped seal at the battery
cap for electrolytic leaks. After the test chamber reaches
5 Torr, it is held at constant pressure, and a constant
temperature of 25◦C for 6 hours.
The mass of the batteries is measured before and
after vacuum exposure to the thousandth of a gram
to examine any potential electrolyte leaks through the
external sleeve of the cell. If the total change in mass of
the batteries exceeds 0.25% the batteries are considered
a failure and unfit for deployment. In addition the
operational capability of the pack is validated by running
the charge/discharge profile discussed in section IV-A.
Fig. 8. Vacuum Chamber
E. Vibration Test
In transit to the ISS the cube-sats will be subject
to high vibrational levels created by the various stages
of the delivery rocket. The levels of vibrations the
payloads will experience are dependent upon various
factors such as the number of stages, the rocket size, the
type of rocket, and the method with which the payload
is attached.
Currently payloads reach the ISS through rocket
launches of different providers. While payload vibration
exposure is partially dependent upon payload weight,
a generalized set of frequencies at certain acceleration
levels can be defined to help simulate similar responses
through the testbed shown in Fig. 9.
Fig. 9. Vibration Test Stand
Based upon research and past experiments, a set of
frequencies and corresponding accelerations were cho-
sen. The spectrum applied to the batteries can be seen
in Table II. The spectrum chosen covers a wide range of
frequencies at various accelerations that would provide
ample energy to excite any possible natural frequencies
and simulate vibrational levels comparable to a launch
event. The frequencies and amplitudes of these vibra-
tions are simultaneously produced and recorded using a
LabView user interface with onboard accelerometers to
monitor vibrations endured by the battery pack. When
tested, batteries are rigidly attached to the vibratory
test bed, and the spectrum applied to each axis of the
batteries (x, y and z) for 60 seconds. Fig. 10 shows the
gui which is used to alter test parameters and examine
the resultant outputs.
After this test the batteries are then checked to en-
sure full charge capabilities and for external damage
and possible internal short-circuiting damage. This is
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Fig. 10. Vibration Certification Test Run
TABLE II
VIBRATION SPECTRUM DETAILS
Frequency GSD((G2)/Hz db/OCT Grms
20.00 0.028800 0.0 0.0
40.00 0.028800 0.00 0.76
70.00 0.072000 4.93 1.43
700.00 0.072000 0.00 6.89
2000.00 0.018720 −3.86 9.65
further validated by running the charge/discharge profile
discussed in section IV-A. If any of the previously
mentioned capabilities are deteriorated significantly by
vibrational exposure, or if external damage has altered
the form of the batteries beyond specifications, or if
external damage inhibits the use of the batteries, then
the batteries are considered to have failed and need to
be replaced.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented a combination of different
testbeds and experiments which are used to certify off-
the-shelf 18650 lithium ion batteries for small satellite
missions. Each of the tests conducted simulated oper-
ating conditions and scenarios which cells and battery
packs may be subjected to once launched. It is very
necessary from the safety perspective to verify the op-
erations and functionality of these components to avoid
any malfunctions which might have a direct impact on
the mission. The developed testbeds satisfy NASA cer-
tification standards for the current battery technologies
used for small satellite missions.
In the future we plan to further generalize the testbeds
for certification of other types of cells. Especially the
vibration test stand needs to be able to accommodate
heavy battery packs with varying dimensions and the
short circuit testbed needs to have higher current carrying
capability within safe operating margins. The goal of
this work is to set up a standardized procedure for these
certification methods which could be easily reproduced
in a relatively short span of time despite minor changes
in cell geometry and electrochemistry as well as mission
requirements.
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